Abstract. Different many-valued logic programming frameworks have been proposed to manage uncertain information in deductive databases and logic programming. A feature of these frameworks is that they rely on a predefined assumption or hypothesis, i.e. an interpretation that assigns the same default truth value to all the atoms of a program, e.g. in the open world assumption, by default all atoms have unknown truth value. In this paper we extend these frameworks along three directions: (i) we will introduce non-monotonic modes of negation; (ii) the default truth values of atoms need not necessarily to be all equal each other; and (iii) a hypothesis can be a partial interpretation. We will show that our approach extends the usual ones: if we restrict our attention to classical logic programs and consider total uniform hypotheses, then our semantics reduces to the usual semantics of logic programs. In particular, under the everything false assumption, our semantics captures and extends the well-founded semantics to these frameworks.
Introduction
An important issue to be addressed in applications of logic programming is the management of uncertainty whenever the information to be represented is of imperfect nature (which happens quite often). The problem of uncertainty management in logic programs has attracted the attention of many researchers and numerous frameworks have been proposed [1-3, 6, 8-11, 13-17] . Each of them addresses the management of different kind of uncertainty: (i) probability theory [6, 10, [13] [14] [15] ; (ii) fuzzy set theory [1, 16, 17] ; (iii) multi-valued logic [8, 9, 11] ; and (iv) possibilistic logic [3] . Apart from the different notion of uncertainty they rely on, these frameworks differ in the way in which uncertainty is associated with the facts and rules of a program. With respect to this latter point, these frameworks can be classified into annotation based (AB) and implication based (IB), which we briefly summarize below. In the AB approach, a rule is of the form A : f (β 1 , . . . , β n ) ← B 1 : β 1 , . . . , B n : β n , which asserts "the certainty of atom A is at least (or is in) f (β 1 , . . . , β n ), whenever the certainty of atom B i is at least (or is in) β i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n". Here f is an n-ary computable function and β i is either a constant or a variable ranging over an appropriate certainty domain. Examples of AB frameworks include [8, 9, 14, 15] . In the IB approach, a rule is of the form A α ← B 1 , ..., B n , which says that the certainty associated with the implication B 1 ∧ ... ∧ B n → A is α. Computationally, given an assignment v of certainties to the B i s, the certainty of A is computed by taking the "conjunction" of the certainties v(B i ) and then somehow "propagating" it to the rule head. The truth values are taken from a certainty lattice. Examples of the IB frameworks include [10, 11, 17] (see [11] for a more detailed comparison between the two approaches). We recall the following facts [11] : (i) while the way implication is treated in the AB approach is closer to classical logic, the way rules are fired in the IB approach has a definite intuitive appeal and (ii) the AB approach is strictly more expressive than the IB. The down side is that query processing in the AB approach is more complicated, e.g. the fixpoint operator is not continuous in general, while it is in the IB approaches. From the above points, it is believed that the IB approach is easier to use and is more amenable for efficient implementation. Nonetheless both approaches stress important limitations for real-world applications, which we will address in this paper: (i) they do not address any mode of non-monotonic reasoning (in particular, no negation operation is defined). The need of non-monotonic formalisms for real-world applications is commonly accepted: our knowledge about the world is almost always incomplete and, thus, we are forced to reason in the absence of complete information. As a result we often have to revise our conclusions, when new information becomes available; (ii) they rely on predefined uniform assumptions, i.e. they assign the same default truth value to all the atoms. Widely used and well known examples of uniform assumptions are the Open World Assumption (OWA), which corresponds to the assumption that every atom whose truth can not be inferred from the program has unknown truth value, and the Closed World Assumption (CWA), which corresponds to the assumption that every such atom's truth value is false. While only uniform assumptions are used, the need of non-uniform assumptions has already been highlighted in the domains of (a) logic-based information retrieval [6] , and (b) information integration [12] , as shown in the following example.
Example 1 (A motivating example). Consider a legal case where a judge has to decide whether to charge a person named Ted accused of murder. To do so, the judge first collects facts from two different sources: the public prosecutor and the person's lawyer. The judge then combines the collected facts using a set of rules in order to reach a decision. For the sake of our example, let us suppose that the judge has collected a set of facts F = {witness(John), friends(John, Ted)} that he combines using a set of rules R as follows 1 :
The two first rules of R describe how the prosecutor works: in order to support the claim that a person X is a suspect, the prosecutor tries to provide a motive (first rule) or a witness against X (second rule). The third and fourth rules of R describe how the lawyer works: in order to support the claim that X is innocent, the lawyer tries to provide an alibi for X by a person who is not a friend of X (third rule), or to use the presumption of innocence if the person is not suspect (fourth rule), i.e. the defendant is assumed innocent until proved guilty. Finally, the last two rules of R are the judge's "decision making rules". Now, what should the value of charge(Ted) be? Ted should be charged if he has been proved effectively suspect or not innocent. We can easily remark that uniform hypotheses, as the CWA and the OWA, do not fit with our expectation. According to the CWA, then the judge will infer that Ted is not innocent and must be charged. According to the OWA, then the atoms suspect(Ted), innocent(Ted) and charged(Ted) are unknown and the judge cannot take a decision (that semantics is often considered as too weak). Another uniform hypothesis is to assign to all atoms the default value true, but under such an assumption, the judge will infer that Ted is suspect and must be charged.
An intuitively appealing non-uniform assumption in this situation is to assume by default that the atoms motive(Ted), witness(Ted) and suspect(Ted) are false, that the atom presumption of innocence(Ted) is true and that the others are unknown. With such a hypothesis, the judge could infer that Ted is innocent, not suspect and should not be charged.
2
We believe that we should not be limited to consider logic program without negation under uniform assumptions only, but be able to associate to any logic program a semantics based on any given hypothesis, which represents our default or assumed knowledge. To this end, we will extend the parametric IB framework [11] , a unifying umbrella for IB frameworks, along three directions: (i) we will introduce negation into the programs, i.e. we will extend the IB frameworks with the non-monotonic mode of negation and extend to that framework the usual semantics of logic programs with negation; (ii) we will consider assumptions that do not necessarily assign the same default truth values to all the atoms; and (iii) we will not only consider total assumptions but also partial assumptions, i.e. we will not require that every atom has a default truth value (an atom's truth value may be still unknown). We will show that our approach extends the usual ones: restricting our attention to logic programs and considering total uniform hypotheses, then our semantics reduces to the usual semantics of logic programs. In particular, under the everywhere false assumption (i) for programs without negation we obtain the semantics presented in [11] ; and (ii) for Datalog programs with negation we obtain the Well Founded Semantics (WFS) [18] . On the other hand, under the almost everywhere empty hypothesis our semantics includes the Kripke-Kleene semantics of Fitting [4] .
In the next section we introduce the syntax of our logical language, we define the notion of satisfiability and present fixpoint operators, through which in Section 3 the intended semantics of our logic programs is specified. Section 4 compares our semantics with others, while Section 5 concludes.
Syntax and semantics: preliminaries
We recall the syntactical aspects of the parametric IB framework presented in [11] and extend it with negation. Let L be an arbitrary first order language that contains infinitely many variable symbols, finitely many constants, and predicate symbols, but no function symbols. While L does not contain function symbols, it contains symbols for families of propagation (F p ), conjunction (F c ) and disjunction functions (F d ), called combination functions.
Let T , , ⊗, ⊕ be a certainty lattice (a complete lattice) and B(T ) the set of finite multisets over T . With ⊥ and we denote the least and greatest element in T , respectively. A propagation function is a mapping from T × T to T and a conjunction or disjunction function is a mapping from B(T ) to T . Each kind of function must verify some of the following properties:
Definition 1 (Normal parametric program). A normal parametric program P (np-program) is a tuple T , R, C, P, D , defined as follows:
1. T is a set of truth values partially ordered by . We assume that T , , ⊗, ⊕ is a complete lattice, where ⊗ is the meet operator and ⊕ the join operator; 2. R is a finite set of normal parametric rules r (np-rules), each of which is a statement of the form r : A αr ← B 1 , ..., B n , ¬C 1 , ..., ¬C m , where A is an atomic formula and B 1 , ..., B n , C 1 , ..., C m are atomic formulas or values in T and α r ∈ T \ {⊥} is the certainty of the rule; 3. C maps each np-rule to a conjunction function in F c ; 4. P maps each np-rule to a propagation function in F p ; 5. D maps each predicate symbol in P to a disjunction function in F d .
For ease of presentation, we write r :
is the disjunction function associated with the predicate symbol A and, f c ∈ F c and f p ∈ F p are respectively the conjunction and propagation functions associated with r. The intention is that the conjunction function (e.g. ⊗) determines the truth value of the conjunction of B 1 , ..., B n , ¬C 1 , ..., ¬C m , the propagation function (e.g. ⊗) determines how to "propagate" the truth value resulting from the evaluation of the body to the head, by taking into account the certainty α r associated to the rule r, while the disjunction function (e.g. ⊕) dictates how to combine the certainties in case an atom is head of several rules. Note that np-programs without negation are parametric programs (p-programs) as defined in [11] . We further define the Herbrand base HB P of a np-program P as the set of all instantiated atoms corresponding to atoms appearing in P and define P * to be the Herbrand instantiation of P , i.e. the set of all ground instantiations of the rules in P . A classical logic program is a np-program such that ⊗ is the unique conjunction and propagation function, ⊕ is the unique disjunction function and α r = , for all rules r ∈ P . Such a program will be denoted in the classical way. If not stated otherwise, with P we will always denote an np-program.
Example 2. Consider the complete lattice T , , ⊗, ⊕ , where
Then the following is a np-program P :
Note that e.g. for predicate suspect, the disjunction function f d is associated, as if there are different ways to infer that someone is suspect, then we would like to increase our suspicion and not just to choose the maximal value.
An interpretation of a np-program P is a function that assigns to all atoms of the Herbrand base of P a value in T . We denote V P (T ) the set of all interpretations of P . Of course, an important issue is to determine which is the semantics of a np-program. In the usual approach, the semantics of a program P is determined by selecting a particular interpretation of P in the set of models of P . In logic programs without negation, as well as in the parametric IB framework, that chosen model is usually the least model of P w.r.t. . Introducing negation in classical logic programs, and in particular in our parametric IB framework, has as consequence that some np-programs do not have a unique minimal model. A usual way to deal with such situations in classical logic consists in considering partial interpretations i.e. interpretations that assign values only to some atoms of HB P and are not defined for the other atoms. A partial interpretation I of P is a partial function from HB P to T . A partial interpretation I can also be seen as the set {A : I(A) | A ∈ HB P and I(A) defined}. Partial interpretations will be used as functions or as sets following the context. Furthermore, in the following, given a np-program P , (i) we denote with r A a rule (r : A αr ← B 1 , ..., B n , ¬C 1 , ..., ¬C m ; f d , f p , f c ) ∈ P * , whose head is A; (ii) given an interpretation I such that each premise in the body of r A is defined under I, with I(r A ) we denote the evaluation of the body of r A w.r.t. I, i.e. I(r A ) = f p (α r , f c ({ |I(B 1 ), . . ., I(B n ), ¬I(C 1 ), . . . , ¬I(C m )| })); and (iii) I(r A ) is undefined in case some premise in the body is undefined in I, except for the case where there is an i such that I(B i ) = ⊥ or I(C i ) = . In that case, we define I(r A ) = ⊥.
Definition 2 (Satisfaction of a np-program). A partial interpretation I
satisfies (is a model of ) P, denoted |= I P , iff ∀A ∈ HB P :
1. if there is a rule r A ∈ P * such that I(r A ) = , then I(A) = ; 2. if for all rules r A ∈ P * , I(r A ) is defined, then I(A) f d (X), where X = { |I(r A ) : r A ∈ P * | }. f d is the disjunction function associated with π(A), the predicate symbol of A. Restricting our attention to positive programs only, the definition of satisfiability of np-programs reduces to that of satisfiability of p-programs defined in [11] , where the interpretation I is not partial but total, i.e. defined for all atoms in HB(P ). Note that for total interpretations, case 1 is a consequence of case 2. From now on, for ease of presentation and without loss of generality, by "programs" we mean "instantiated" programs. We extend the ordering on T to the space of interpretations V P (T ). Let I 1 and I 2 be in V P (T ), then I 1 I 2 if and only if I 1 (A) I 2 (A) for all ground atoms A. Under this ordering V P (T ) becomes a complete lattice, and we have (I 1 ⊗ I 2 )(A) = I 1 (A) ⊗ I 2 (A), and similarly for the other operators. The actions of functions can be extended from atoms to formulae as follows: I(f c (X, Y )) = f c (I(X), I(Y )), and similarly for the other functions. Finally, for all α in T and for all I in V P (T ), I(α) = α.
We now define a new operator T H P inspired by [5, 12] . That operator is parameterized by an interpretation H on {⊥, }. That interpretation represents our default knowledge and we will call it a hypothesis to stretch the fact that it represents default knowledge and not "sure knowledge". Such a hypothesis asserts that some atoms are assumed ⊥ (false) and some others are assumed to be (true). In the context of logic programming with uncertainty, a more general approach would consist in considering any interpretation over T as a possible assumption. Nevertheless, the need of non-uniform assumptions like those of the type defined in this paper, i.e. by default the truth value of an atom maybe true, f alse or unknown, where already considered of interest by the literature [6, 12] . We are aware that this is a limitation and that allowing a hypothesis being any interpretation would give us the most complete approach. But yet unresolved computational difficulties prevent us to consider the generalised case.
The operator T H P infers new information from two interpretations: the first one is used to evaluate the positive literals, while the second one is used to evaluate the negative literals of the bodies of rules in P .
Definition 3 (Parameterized immediate consequence operator). Let P and H be any np-program and a hypothesis, respectively. The immediate consequence operator T H P is a mapping from V P (T )×V P (T ) to V P (T ), defined as follows: for every pair (I, J) of interpretations in V P (T ), for every atom A, if there is no rule in P with A as its head, then T 
Note that in case negation is absent and H assigns the value ⊥ to all the atoms, then T H P reduces to the immediate consequence operator defined in [11] . Proposition 1. T H P is monotonic in its first argument, and anti-monotonic in its second argument w.r.t. .
Using Proposition 1 and the Knaster-Tarsky theorem, we can define an operator S H P , likewise [7] and derived from T beginning with H. But, in order to deal with non-uniform hypotheses, we need first to define the notion of stratification w.r.t. positive cycles.
Definition 4 (Extended positive cycle).
A positive cycle of P is a set of rules {r A1 , ..., r An } of P such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, A i (resp. A n ) appears positively in the body of r Ai+1 (resp. r A1 ). An extended positive cycle is a positive cycle C extended with the rules in P whose head is the head of one of the rules of C.
Definition 5 (Stratification w.r.t. extended positive cycles). A stratification w.r.t. extended positive cycles of a np-program P is a sequence of npprograms P 1 , ..., P n such that for the mapping σ from rules of P to [1...n], 1. P 1 , ..., P n is a partition of P and every rule r is in P σ(r) ; 2. for any r 1 and r 2 in P , where the head of r 2 appears in the body of r 1 and there is no extended positive cycle of P containing r 1 , σ(r 1 ) = σ(r 2 ) holds; 3. for any r 1 and r 2 in P appearing in the same extended positive cycle, σ(r 1 ) = σ(r 2 ) holds; 4. if r 1 and r 2 in P are such that the head of r 2 appears in the body of r 1 and there is an extended positive cycle of P containing r 1 but no extended positive cycle of P containing both r 1 and r 2 , then σ(r 2 ) < σ(r 1 ) holds.
Note that every np-program has a stratification w.r.t. extended positive cycles.
Proposition 2. Given a np-program P with a stratification P 1 = P w.r.t. extended positive cycles, an interpretation J be over T and a partial hypothesis H over {⊥, } such that for all extended positive cycles {r A1 , ..., r A k } of P , H(A 1 ) = ... = H(A k ) holds. Then the sequence defined by a 0 = H and a n+1 = T H P (a n , J) converges.
Definition 6 (The parameterized alternating operator S H P ). Consider P with stratification w.r.t. the extended positive cycles P 1 , ..., P n and let J be an interpretation over T . Let H be an interpretation over {⊥, } such that for all extended positive cycles {r A1 , ..., r A k } of P , H(A 1 ) = ... = H(A k ) holds. Then S Intuitively, during the computation of S H P (J), we fix the value of the negative premises in P with their values in J. Then we consider the "positive program" and evaluate that program stratum by stratum. After the evaluation of a stratum, we know that the knowledge obtained cannot be modified by what we will infer by activating the rules of the next strata. While a program may have more than one stratification w.r.t. extended positive cycles, the result of the computation does not depend on the stratification used for the computation. Note that the notion of stratification and the condition on H that we have introduced are indispensable for the convergence of the computation. 
Semantics under non-uniform assumptions
In this section we will determine what model, among all the models, is the intended model of a np-program w.r.t. a given hypothesis. For the rest of the paper, if not stated otherwise, any hypothesis is supposed to assign the same default value to the atoms that are heads of rules of a same extended positive cycle. From Proposition 1, we derive the following property of S H P . Proposition 3. Given P and a total non-uniform hypothesis H, S H P is antimonotone w.r.t. and, thus S
There is a well-know property, which derives from the Knaster-Tarski theorem and deals with anti-monotone functions on complete lattices: Proposition 4 ( [19] ). For a anti-monotone function f on a complete lattice T , there are two extreme oscillation points of f , µ and ν in T , such that: (i) µ and ν are the least and greatest fixpoint of the composition f • f ; (ii) f oscillates between µ and ν, i.e. f (µ) = ν and f (ν) = µ; (iii) if x and y are also elements of T between which f oscillates then x and y lie between µ and ν.
Under the ordering , S
H P is anti-monotone and V P (T ) is a complete lattice, so S H P has two extreme oscillation points under this ordering. Let I ⊥ be the interpretation that assigns the value ⊥ to all atoms of HB(P ), i.e. the minimal element of V P (T ) w.r.t. , while let I be the interpretation that assigns the value to all atoms of HB(P ), i.e. the maximal element of V P (T ) w.r.t. . Proposition 5. Let P and H be any np-program and a total non-uniform hypothesis, respectively. S H P has two extreme oscillation points, S
Similarly to van Gelder's alternating fixpoint approach [7] , S H ⊥ and S H are respectively a under-estimation and an over-estimation of P , but w.r.t. any hypothesis H. As the meaning of P we propose to consider as defined only the atoms whose values coincide in both limit interpretations. The truth value of atoms, whose truth value oscillates the "unknown" value is assigned. Proposition 8. If P is a np-program without negation then the compromise semantics M I ⊥ (P ) of P (or equivalently the consensus semantics C I ⊥ (P )) w.r.t. the hypothesis I ⊥ coincides with the Lakshmanan and Shiri's semantics of P . Now, we compare our semantics with the well-founded semantics [18] .
Proposition 9. Let P be a Datalog program with negation. The compromise semantics M I ⊥ (P ) of P (or equivalently the consensus semantics C I ⊥ (P )) w.r.t. the hypothesis I ⊥ coincides with the well-founded semantics of P .
Our approach extends the well-founded semantics to the IB framework as well. Finally, we can compare the semantics with the usual semantics and in particular with the Kripke-Kleene semantics [4] . Let us define the almost everywhere empty hypothesis H P w.r.t. P as follows: H(A) = ⊥ if A is not the head of any rule, else H(A) is undefined.
Proposition 10. Let P be a Datalog program with negation and H P the almost everywhere empty hypothesis w.r.t. P . Let W F S(P ) be the well-founded semantics of P and KK(P ) be the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P . Then KK(P ) ⊆ C H P (P ) ⊆ W F S(P ) holds.
The consensus semantics C H P (P ) of P represents more knowledge than the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P , but less than the well-founded semantics of P . This results shows the well-known fact that the Kripke-Kleene semantics of P is weaker than the well-founded semantics of P .
Example 12. For P = {B ← A, B ← ¬A, A ← A}, KK(P ) = ∅ ⊂ C H P (P ) = {B : } ⊂ W F S(P ) = {A : ⊥, B : } holds. 2
Conclusion
We have presented a framework for reasoning about uncertainty and negation in deductive databases and logic programming. Our framework uses parameterized semantics of implication-based logic programming with negation under nonuniform assumptions for the missing information. We have also seen that when we restrict our framework to uniform assumptions only, our approach captures and extends the semantics of conventional logic programs. Obviously, having considered a restricted, still useful, form of hypothesis, puts the generalisation to arbitrary hypothesis to be our primary topic for future work.
